Testing Assumptions About US Foreign Policy in 2024

Conventional wisdom: Elections don’t hinge on foreign policy

But by July 1992, fewer than three in ten Americans approved of Bush’s performance. And, six months later, he was out of office, bested by the Arkansas governor (with an assist from Texas billionaire Ross Perot). The Clinton campaign’s unofficial mantra, “it’s the economy, stupid,” forever enshrined the sense that successful candidates must be laser-focused on Americans’ economic well-being and a concern for life here at home.

There have been exceptions, however. In the 2006 midterms, frustration over the Iraq War was devastating for Republicans. In making the case for war four years earlier, the George W. Bush administration had tapped into concerns about terrorism, with war advocates claiming a “connection” between Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda. Moreover, the war was supposed to be over quickly and cost little. None of these assertions proved to be accurate. Though the U.S. economy was doing relatively well in November 2006 — the financial crisis was still a year away — the unpopular war was an albatross around the GOP’s neck. The Democrats won six seats in the Senate, and 31 in the House, securing control of both chambers.

Another exception to the “foreign-policy-doesn’t-move-elections” rule played out in 2016. At a memorable debate in South Carolina on February 13, 2016, Donald Trump attacked George W. Bush for lying about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and for his poor judgement in getting the country into a war that cost $2 trillion. It was all “a big, fat mistake,” Trump thundered. Then-Florida Governor Jeb Bush won cheers and applause from the crowd when he defended his brother’s decisions, but Trump won the votes in the South Carolina primary just a week later.

Trump continued to hammer foreign policy themes in the general election campaign with former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, castigating her for her early support for the Iraq War, and intimating that Clinton was likely to entangle the United States in more foreign wars. “Trump’s ability to connect with voters in communities exhausted by more than fifteen years of war,” concluded researchers Douglas Kriner and Francis Shen, “may have been critically important to his narrow election victory.”

So, what does 2024 portend? Recent polling by the Associated Press-National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago suggests that Americans are much more concerned about foreign policy than they have been in the recent past. For example, when asked to name up to five issues that they wanted the government to work on in 2024, 38% of Americans identified foreign policy, the second-leading issue behind the economy. Foreign policy had registered a mere 18% in a similar poll a year ago. And, in the most recent AP/NORC survey, 20% of respondents worried about “U.S. involvement overseas” a four-fold increase from before.

In comparing Biden’s and Trump’s likely foreign policies, voters will have to separate words from actions. Biden has steadfastly refused to send U.S. personnel to fight in Ukraine and has mostly resisted calls for escalation that would have increased the risk of U.S. forces being drawn in inadvertently — e.g., no-fly zones. But his unwavering support for Israel’s war in Gaza has divided Democrats and could cost him votes, including in Michigan, a critical swing state in the election.

For his part, as president, Trump ordered the assassination of a senior Iranian general, an act that brought the United States close to the brink of war with Iran. He had wanted to remove troops from Syria, but he was convinced that the U.S. presence there would be helpful for his other goal, seizing Syria’s oil. (It wasn’t, and he didn’t.) Similarly, instead of ending the U.S. war in Afghanistan, Trump sent more troops there. Biden ended the unpopular war in August 2021, but his own popularity dipped below 50% for the first time following the withdrawal of U.S. troops that month — and Biden hasn’t recovered since.

In short, Trump’s professed opposition to U.S. military intervention did not manifest during his term in office. Biden’s instinct to end one war did not signal a determination to avoid all other foreign entanglements. And, most important, U.S. relations with China — the world’s second-largest country, have trended steadily downward under both presidents. Neither Trump nor Biden has a plan for setting US-China relations right.

Be that as it may, Trump seems poised to wield foreign policy to his advantage. In a November CBS/YouGov poll, 49% of respondents believed that a Biden victory would increase the chances of the United States becoming involved in a war, whereas 43% believed that a Trump victory made U.S. involvement less likely. In that same poll, 47% thought Trump’s policies “would increase peace and stability”; only 31% held that opinion of a second Biden term.

So, keep an eye on foreign policy in the election this year. It is rarely decisive, but it can tip the scales in a close race, which 2024 promises to be.

Conventional wisdom: US-China relations will get worse in 2024

Although much of the U.S. media’s coverage of the meeting between the two leaders framed the interaction as driving the two countries toward conflict, instead their meeting should be seen as a productive exchange that furthers the Biden administration’s efforts to stabilize relations between Beijing and Washington. Numerous points of significant tension remain between China and the United States, but the shift in the Biden administration’s approach to diplomatic engagement signals that the nadir in US-China relations may have passed for the duration of Biden’s first term.

Although the coverage of the APEC summit focused on Xi’s forceful position on Taiwan, the public statements from both the United States and China following the meeting between the two leaders were positive. The two sides announced that they would resume high-level military-to-military communication, cooperate on cracking down on the production of illicit synthetic drugs like fentanyl, and collaborate on safety guidelines around the development of artificial intelligence (AI). Representatives of the two sides acknowledged substantial differences, but there was a broadly shared commitment to continue to work toward improved relations.

These statements were a continuation of the increased diplomacy between the United States and China in 2023. Exchanges between Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo and their Chinese counterparts represent a major diplomatic push and a marked shift from the lack of direct dialogue between the two countries during the first two years of the Biden administration. Secretary Yellen plans to visit China again in 2024, and the United States is willing to expand dialogue further. Following the APEC summit, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin pledged to “seek practical discussions with [the Chinese] from a senior leader level to the working level.”

Beyond dialogues and summits, some concrete steps taken by the United States and China indicate an intent to find areas for cooperation rather than engaging solely in competition. In 2023, negotiations led to an increase in flights between the two countries, with even more planned in 2024, an important step for allowing the people-to-people exchanges that both sides agreed should be increased at the APEC summit. In addition, the United States lifted restrictions on 27 Chinese firms, paving the way for productive discussions between U.S. Commerce Secretary Raimondo and Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao, who concluded their meeting by saying, “I’m ready to work with you together to foster a more favorable policy environment, for stronger cooperation between our businesses to bolster bilateral trade and investment in a stable and predictable manner.”

Despite signs of the United States and China working toward establishing a floor under the relationship – ensuring there is at least a minimum level of cooperation – there is a substantial risk of relations devolving in 2024. The U.S. presidential campaign is likely to feature hawkish rhetoric toward China from both the Democratic and Republican candidates, as well as those in races further down the ticket. China’s behavior may only fuel that dynamic as Beijing continues to stake its claims more aggressively in the South China Sea and elsewhere. Furthermore, the outcome of the 2024 Taiwanese elections may pose a major challenge to the current trajectory of increased US-China cooperation because the new Taiwanese leadership may prove to be far more aggressively pro-independence than President Tsai Ing-Wen. But as long as both Beijing and Washington see the benefits of continuing high-level dialogue and committing to pursue narrow agreements on shared interests, the relationship may be able to withstand domestic pressures.

Conventional wisdom: Europe is willing to join with the United States to counter China’s growing power and influence

But next July, as Washington hosts a NATO summit to mark the 75th anniversary of the founding of the alliance, this approach will face a key test. Contrary to the administration’s hopes and expectations, however, the United States’ European allies are unlikely to align more closely with the U.S. on China.

To many in Washington, the war in Ukraine serves as a case for building a transregional coalition of democracies. In the wake of Russian aggression, Washington and its democratic allies — both those in Europe and Asia — quickly came together in support of Ukraine’s right to self-defense, publicly condemning Russia’s actions, imposing a series of unprecedented financial and trade sanctions on Russia, and sending billions in arms and other assistance to Ukraine. Encouraged by this moment of democratic solidarity, the Biden team now hopes to repeat its success.

“What we’re seeing now is an unprecedented level of Asian interest and focus,” in joining with the United States and Europe to “sustain a country under siege,” Kurt M. Campbell, the White House Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific said only days after the start of the war in Ukraine. “And I believe one of the outcomes of this tragedy will be a kind of new thinking around how to solidify institutional connections beyond what we’ve already seen between Europe and the Pacific,” he added. The Biden administration has been building on this momentum, attempting to draw Europe into a balancing coalition with its liberal democratic allies in Asia against China.

At last year’s NATO summit, Washington succeeded in placing the China challenge near the top of the agenda. When the alliance released its new Strategic Concept, the second-most important political document after NATO’s founding treaty, it sounded a tough new tone, declaring China’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies” as constituting “systemic challenges” to transatlantic security. Since then, Washington has pushed Europeans to adopt more stringent export control and outbound investment standards in their economic relations with China.

At first glance, the White House seems to have had some success with these efforts. In October, for example, the European Commission unveiled a list of four critical technologies — quantum computing, biotechnology, advanced semiconductors, and AI — that it seeks to prevent from falling into the hands of rivals. But the list is far more notable for what it left out — any mention of China by name, as well as a host of other cutting-edge technologies, like renewable energy and electronic vehicles.

The reality is that Europe remains deeply divided over China policy. Three years into the Biden administration, many European allies — including France and Germany — are still wary of adopting a hawkish stance toward Beijing. Both countries have pushed back against European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s calls for de-risking economic ties with China. Significantly, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has insisted that de-risking is “mainly about decisions that need to be taken by companies,” not a government policy. Germany has pushed ahead with business and investments in China, while the French have actively courted Chinese business, suggesting the European Union’s (EU’s) two largest economies are simply unwilling to tow Washington’s hard line.

But the Biden administration is unlikely to be deterred. In 2024, it will probably double down, stepping up its efforts to cajole Europe into a closer alignment with the United States on China. For the White House, playing host to NATO leaders in an election year, the Washington summit will offer an opportunity to tout both NATO’s shift to a more confrontational approach toward Beijing, as well as its growing ties to U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific, both of which are apt to play well domestically. It will also offer a major test of the Biden administration’s big bet on Europe in the Indo-Pacific. All signs warn of disappointment. The United States’ European allies may offer some tough words, but they are unlikely to offer much more.

Conventional wisdom: US outreach efforts toward Global South countries’ postures will lead to major changes vis-à-vis China and Russia

These crises displayed, on the one hand, the United States’ weak relations with most Global South countries and, on the other, China’s — and to some extent, Russia’s — success in developing strong diplomatic, economic, and military ties with these states.

Washington reacted with various moves, such as the December 2022 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, Biden’s call for an extension of the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) membership, and recognition of the Cook Islands and Niue “as sovereign and independent” states in September 2023.

However, it would be a mistake for U.S. policymakers to believe that these demonstrations of interest will result in a drastic change of posture by Global South countries. To be sure, some countries such as Pacific island states like Fiji, Nauru, and Tonga, have historical ties with Washington, which have often led them to align with the United States at the UN. But other major U.S. partners like India, Brazil, and South Africa, or smaller countries like Chile, Barbados, and Jamaica, have shown their commitment to a pragmatic foreign policy that aligns with their national priorities. As a result, these countries have resisted U.S. pressure to choose to partner with either the United States or its adversaries.

Moreover, beyond lip service, the United States has so far failed to prove its actual commitment to tangible change in global governance. The Biden administration has yet to unveil its proposal for UNSC membership reform — which is, in any case, unlikely to abolish or amend the veto power, a fundamental challenge to the UNSC’s legitimacy and credibility. There is also skepticism about Washington’s willingness to push for a tangible reform of the Bretton Woods institutions. In September 2023, U.S. Treasury Under Secretary for International Affairs Jay Shambaugh affirmed U.S. support for “an equiproportional increase in quotas — an increase that is allocated to all members in proportion to their existing shares” — in other words, no actual change in voting powers. Even in terms of bilateral agreements, the United States has still not taken any steps to remove the highly controversial Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) system from existing U.S. trade and investment agreements. According to trade and investment expert Alicia Nicholls, “some of the most consequential ISDS disputes have been between investors from Global North countries and Global South respondent states . . . [and the] largest ISDS compensation awards have been in the billions of dollars, exceeding the GDP of many small states.”

In other words, while many Global South countries demand concrete changes in global governance to move beyond colonial-era international rules and enact principles that truly foster inclusivity, prosperity, and security for all, the United States has not taken significant actions to share power and support consequential reform. Worse, Washington appears to cling to an outdated vision of the international system and seems unable to demonstrate strategic empathy toward its Global South counterparts. That leaves U.S. leaders working from a skewed perception of the United States’ standing in the world and a deep misunderstanding of what type of engagement Global South countries are interested in. Leaders of many of these states seek to advance their countries’ own interests, and they will partner with anyone that enables them to do so. Although the current great-power competition may lead them to juggle their partnerships with China, Russia, and the United States, the past two years have demonstrated how, nonetheless, they will continue to pursue pragmatic cooperation with all sides.

Conventional (but untested) wisdom: Europe will increase defense spending if the US reduces its support for NATO

Unusual for a theoretical debate, this question bleeds over into public, high-stakes policy discussions about the U.S. role in European security. Does the U.S. military presence in Europe and its role in NATO discourage European states from investing in their militaries and defensive capabilities? Or does the U.S. presence help to facilitate European cooperation on defense, improve interoperability, and encourage future investment?

Answering this question is harder than one might think. A few minor cases of American pullback can be found, such as during the 1970s, when effective messaging around burden shifting from the Nixon administration, followed by America’s post-Vietnam hangover, led European states to briefly increase defense spending. But in general, the only time when the United States significantly retrenched from Europe was in the mid-1990s, when the collapse of the Soviet Union also removed the only significant military threat to European states; unsurprisingly, military spending fell across the board during that decade.

And even recent periods of acute threat to European allies — including the 2014 and 2022 Russian invasions of Ukraine — do not provide a good test of this assumption because the United States maintained or increased its commitments to European defense in each case. In short, we have not been able to adequately assess this assumption because there is too little variation in the independent variable: the United States has never sufficiently pulled back to test it.

In 2024, however, two specific scenarios suggest that this proposition might finally be tested. The first would test a weaker form of this assumption: that European states will step up their financial support and their contributions of arms for the war in Ukraine if the U.S. Congress is unable to come to an agreement on further funding for Kyiv. Early indications might suggest either increased support (e.g., recent EU moves to increase funding to Kyiv) or a failure to do so (e.g., complications in those negotiations along with increased skepticism in Germany and elsewhere about the course of the war). There is also a potential confounding factor: European states are so dependent on U.S. technology that in some areas they simply cannot supply arms to Ukraine on their own.

The second — and more significant — test of this proposition would occur if a second Trump administration were to become more likely. Throughout his first presidency, Trump expressed repeated skepticism about the value of U.S. alliances in Europe; leaks suggest that he will pursue a significant reduction of the U.S. role in NATO if re-elected. Unlike the war in Ukraine, a potential American retrenchment from NATO might well see European states step up their direct contributions to defense, both financially and in concrete military capabilities.

In both scenarios, however, policymakers need to be careful not to reject the idea that retrenchment can promote burden-sharing simply because European states’ responses are not overwhelming or consistent. Observers of European defense politics have long noted that a central obstacle to European defense investments is the differing levels of threat that EU states face, depending on their geographical proximity to the borders of the bloc. Even in the absence of significant U.S. military commitments to Europe, states like Germany might not perceive enough of a threat from Russia to significantly alter their spending patterns. But even if the EU — or some other cross-European bloc — is not able to come together, the assumption that U.S. retrenchment would increase European provision of defense would still be proven true if the countries closest to the threat — particularly those geographically closest to Russia — began to dramatically increase their defense spending or look for other ways to guarantee their security.

Conventional wisdom: The United States has a coherent strategy based on sustaining primacy

The Biden administration finds itself deeply, yet mostly vicariously, entangled in two open-ended wars — in Ukraine and the Israel-Palestinian conflict — whose resolutions are elusive and where the United States appears unwilling or unable to shape preferred outcomes. In both cases, support for these policies from a divided Congress and a war-weary U.S. public appears increasingly problematic and may impact the upcoming presidential elections.

In the Ukraine case, the United States has provided more than $75 billion in economic and military aid in addition to increased U.S. troop deployments in Europe. With regard to Israel, the United States has increased military aid on top of the mandated $3.8 billion in existing aid. A risk of escalation to direct U.S. combat with Russia in Ukraine remains. In the Middle East, U.S. forces have already engaged with Iran-backed proxy forces — the Houthis in Yemen — and Iran-backed militia in Iraq and Syria.

Yet, in the Biden administration’s October 2022 National Security Strategy, Biden said the world is “at an inflection point in history,” and we are “in the midst of a strategic competition to shape the future of the international order.” But the strategy identifies Asia as the strategic priority, focusing on China as, “the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to advance that objective.” No question, from chip wars to near US-China military misses in the South China Sea, competition with China persists.

The premise that the United States alone must play “Globocop,” driven by the mission of American exceptionalism, means any perceived challenge to U.S. values or expansive interests — vital or not — tends to pull in unanticipated directions, regardless of declared strategic priorities. President Biden seems undeterred by the proliferating wars and mounting U.S. commitments. At an October 2023 campaign event, he again called the United States “the essential nation,” arguing, “…we’re the United States of America, for God’s sake.  And there’s nothing — nothing beyond our capacity — nothing . . .”

But a $1.7 trillion FY23 budget deficit and a $34 trillion national debt should remind U.S. policymakers that American resources are not unlimited. Choices to intervene in one situation may constrain options for a higher-priority problem elsewhere. The war in Ukraine, for example, has brought into stark relief the inadequacies — if not a hollowing out — of the U.S. defense industrial base. Shortages have limited the amount of ammunition and air defense technologies that the United States is able to provide Ukraine.

Resolutions to either the conflict in Ukraine or the situation in the Middle East do not appear to be on the horizon; both are likely to fester. Although Biden has declared in his National Security Strategy that the United States should prioritize Asia, U.S. commitments of resources are increasingly dispersed in other areas. Ukraine is devolving into a war of attrition and stalemate. If everything is a priority, then nothing is a priority. This failure to grasp the limits of American power, both in terms of resources and agency to achieve goals, continues to plague U.S. foreign policy.

As 2024 dawns, a record number of armed conflicts are underway. The ability of the United States to remain focused on three regions at once will be tested following the presidential elections in Taiwan on January 13. China is almost certain to react harshly if Lai Ching-te, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party candidate consistently leading in the polls, is elected. If Beijing overreacts and steps up coercive air and naval incursions around Taiwan, heightened US-China tensions and possible confrontation could ensue. 

The U.S. overstretch in reacting to disparate and disconnected events renders problem-solving more difficult and tempts adversaries. Prioritization is essential. A deeply polarized Congress, growing major-power competition, and troubling U.S. budget deficits illuminate real-world constraints and menacing risks. In one of his last public comments, the late Henry Kissinger underscored the risks: “We are at the edge of war with Russia and China on issues which we partly created, without any concept of how this is going to end or what it’s supposed to lead to.”

Grand strategy, particularly at a turbulent time of historic change, is problematic, more so when shaped by exceptionalist ideology and outmoded assumptions. A focus on priorities and understanding the limits of power is the beginning of wisdom.